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The existence of hierarchical order in social systems is a 
general and striking pattern in nature (Dawkins 1976). A pri-
mary example is the prevalence of dominance hierarchies, in 
which the members of a group establish dominance ranks that 
influence access to resources or mating opportunities (Drews 
1993). How social order on the scale of whole societies or 
groups can emerge from a series of social interactions between 
two individuals has been a central question in social biology 
(Landau, 1951a, 1951b; Chase, 1982a; Dugatkin, 1997; Faust, 
2007). An important component of such research is to estab-
lish useful metrics that can capture essential aspects of hierar-
chical organization.
Since the first descriptions of ‘peck order’ in groups of 
hens (Schjelderup-Ebbe 1922), studies of dominance structure 
have often focused on why animal groups often seem to be ar-
ranged into linear hierarchies. A strictly linear hierarchy is one 
in which higher-ranked individuals dominate all individuals 
of lower rank. Within a strictly linear hierarchy, all dyads have 
a dominant–subordinate relation, and dominance relations for 
every set of three players (triads) are ‘transitive’: when indi-
vidual A dominates B and B dominates C, then A also domi-
nates C (Chase, 1982a; de Vries, 1995). In contrast, a triad ar-
ranged in a ‘cycle’ (e.g. A dominates B, B dominates C, and 
C dominates A) results in dominance relations that are unre-
solved and prevents the linear arrangement of ranks. The or-
derly and predictable arrangement of dominance ranks in a 
linear hierarchy is thought to have important consequences for 
individual fitness and group stability (Ellis, 1995; van Doorn 
et al., 2003; Cant et al., 2006). The structure of dominance hi-
erarchies is typically measured using one of two indepen-
dently derived indices, Kendall’s K and Landau’s h ( Kendall 
and Babington Smith, 1940; Landau, 1951a; Appleby, 1983; de 
Vries, 1995; also see Methods). Although they are not identi-
cal, the two indices generally yield the same values (see Meth-
ods; de Vries 1995) describing the degree to which an animal 
group adheres to a strict linear hierarchy. Thus, these indices 
are commonly referred to as metrics of ‘linearity’.
A major limitation of linearity indices is that they become 
biased when some pairs of individuals fail to interact (de 
Vries, 1995; Klass and Cords, 2011). This bias arises in part be-
cause strict linear hierarchies can occur only in groups where 
dominant–subordinate relations exist for every dyad in the 
group. Networks in which all dyadic relations are asymmetri-
cal (e.g. dominant–subordinate) are called ‘tournaments’ (Ha-
rary & Moser 1966). However, tournaments rarely arise natu-
rally in animal groups, and as we will show, unknown dyadic 
relationships are common because certain pairs of individu-
als fail to interact (hereafter ‘null dyads’). Currently popular 
Published in Animal Behaviour 83 (2012), pp. 925–934; doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.01.011
Copyright © 2012 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour; published by Elsevier Ltd. Used by permission.
Submitted September 20, 2011; accepted December 9, 2011; published online January 31, 2012
A Social Network Perspective on  
Measurements of Dominance Hierarchies
Daizaburo Shizuka and David B. McDonald
Department of Zoology and Physiology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA
Corresponding author — D. Shizuka
Abstract
The hierarchical organization of dominance relations among animals has wide-ranging implications in social evolution. 
The structure of dominance relations has often been measured using indices of linearity (e.g. Landau’s h, Kendall’s K): 
the degree to which dominance relations adhere to a linear hierarchy. An alternative measure is the transitivity of 
dominance relations among sets of three players that all interact with each other, a measure we call triangle transitivity 
(ttri). Triangle transitivity and linearity are essentially equivalent when dominance relations of all dyads are known, 
but such complete observations are rare in empirical studies. Triangle transitivity has two major advantages: it does 
not require ‘filling in’ of unobserved relations, and its expected value is constant across group sizes. We use a social 
network perspective to demonstrate a property of transitivity in random directed networks (on average, three-fourths 
of complete triads are transitive) and show that empirical dominance networks are often significantly more transitive 
than random networks. Using 101 published dominance matrices we show that published algorithms for assessing 
linearity underestimate the level of social orderliness, particularly in larger groups, which tend to have more null 
dyads. Thus, previous puzzlement over the decrease in estimated linearity in larger groups could be due largely to the 
bias introduced by random filling of null dyads. We argue that triangle transitivity will allow researchers to focus on 
important processes underlying the dynamics of dominance, such as spatial segregation, avoidance of interactions by 
certain individuals and detailed temporal patterns in the ontogeny of hierarchy formation.
Keywords: aggression, imputation, Landau’s h, orderliness, peck order, random network, social structure, triad census
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methods call for random ‘imputation’: null dyads (missing 
data) are ‘filled in’ with randomized dominance relations (de 
Vries 1995). Randomization procedures are often used to re-
duce bias in such imputation methods (Nakagawa & Freckle-
ton 2008). However, we show that random filling of null dy-
ads inevitably produces a different but pernicious negative 
bias in estimated linearity.
Dyads may fail to interact for multiple reasons, and the pro-
cesses that lead to noninteractions may be of biological inter-
est. First, spatial or temporal segregation may make it impossi-
ble for some dyads to interact. Inferring a dominance relation 
between such individuals would be a purely artificial exercise. 
Alternatively, some individuals may actively avoid interac-
tions. Such avoidance could arise because the costs of interac-
tion are too high (e.g. escalation of contest is likely), the poten-
tial benefits of interaction are too low, or because dominance 
relations can be settled without resorting to overt interactions 
(e.g. by long-distance signalling or by third-party effects). Fi-
nally, some interactions may simply have been unobserved. It 
is difficult and often impossible to distinguish between these 
processes that give rise to noninteractions. However, it is pos-
sible to measure directly the frequency of transitive and cyclic 
triadic relations within the observed set of dominance interac-
tions, thereby avoiding the bias introduced by imputation pro-
cedures. Using this approach, we reveal heretofore-unappreci-
ated levels of orderliness in animal groups.
Our approach is based on the triad census, a tool com-
monly used in social network analysis to count directly the fre-
quencies of all triadic configurations in the data (Figures 1 & 
A1; Holland and Leinhardt, 1970, 1976; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994; Faust, 2007). The triad census allows us simply to com-
pare the frequencies of transitive and cyclic triads. The relative 
frequencies of triadic configurations, or ‘motifs’ are routinely 
used to characterize the structural properties of networks 
(Kendall and Babington Smith, 1940; Harary and Moser, 1966; 
Holland and Leinhardt, 1976; Frank and Harary, 1982; Karl-
berg, 1999; Milo et al., 2002; Faust, 2008; Allesina and Levine, 
2011). Here, we build on this body of work to define a metric 
(Pt) that quantifies the proportion of transitive triads among 
all ‘triangles’ (those triads in which all dominance relations 
were established and thus could potentially be transitive). 
We will first show that the expectation for Pt in a random net-
work is 0.75, regardless of group size or matrix sparseness. Us-
ing this expectation as the baseline, we develop a scaled index 
of ‘triangle transitivity’ (ttri). Measures of linearity and trian-
gle transitivity take different approaches to describe an essen-
tial component of dominance hierarchies: the tendency of tri-
adic relations to be ordered (i.e. transitive) rather than cyclic. 
Linearity (K and h indices) describes the transitivity of domi-
nance relations in the context of tournaments, whereas trian-
gle transitivity (ttri) is the transitivity of the subset of triads in 
which all dominance relations were observed. These both dif-
fer slightly from other measures of transitivity ( Holland and 
Leinhardt, 1976; Frank and Harary, 1982; Karlberg, 1999). Be-
cause the terms ‘linearity’, ‘transitivity’ and ‘triangle transitiv-
ity’ all refer to distinct methods for measuring the tendency of 
triadic relations to be ordered (Table 1), we will use the gen-
eral term ‘orderliness’ to refer to this family of metrics. Our 
goals are to use a network approach to illuminate some com-
plications related to the analysis of orderliness in dominance 
relations in animal groups and provide some potential ave-
nues for further exploration of social systems.
Methods
Calculating Measures of Linearity
de Vries (1995) gave a thorough account of two methods of 
measuring linearity: Kendall’s K (originally denoted as ζ: Ken-
dall and Babington Smith, 1940; Appleby, 1983) and Landau’s 
h (Landau 1951a). With the exception of subtle differences 
when measuring linearity in groups with even versus odd 
Table 1. Operational definitions of terms
Cycle* — A particular form of triad in which directional relations form 
a cycle, e.g. A dominates B, B dominates C, and C dominates A 
(A > B > C > A). In a tournament, all intransitive triads are cycles.
Imputation — A general term for procedures to substitute a missing 
data point with some value.
Linear hierarchy — Dominance structure fulfilling two criteria: (1) all 
dyads have a dominant–subordinate relation, and (2) all triadic 
relations are transitive. Synonyms: complete acyclic digraph, peck or-
der, transitive tournament.
Linearity — A generic term to describe one of two indices: Kendall’s 
K and Landau’s h. These both describe how close the structure of 
dominance relation is to a linear hierarchy. See Methods for de-
tails on the indices.
Orderliness — The tendency of triadic relationships to be ordered, or 
transitive. By our definition, linearity and triangle transitivity are 
both measures of orderliness.
Tournament — A directed network composed purely of asymmetrical 
dyads. Synonym: Round robin tournament.
Transitive triad* — A set of three nodes that are all connected to each 
other, in which the asymmetrical relationships are transitive (if 
A > B and B > C, then A > C). Synonyms: ordered triple.
Transitivity* — Generically, the proportion of a given set of triads that 
are transitive. Mathematically, it can be defined in several differ-
ent ways for directed and undirected networks (e.g., see Holland 
and Leinhardt, 1976; Frank and Harary, 1982; Karlberg, 1999).
Triangle — A set of three nodes, each of which is connected to the 
other two. Synonym: closed triad, complete triad.
Triangle Transitivity — An index based on the proportion of transitive 
triangles among all triangles in a network.
* These terms have different definitions when applied to undirected 
networks.
Figure 1. Configurations of seven possible triads in a network 
with no mutual dyads. Triangles (triads with three edges) can 
either be ‘Transitive’ or ‘Cyclic’.
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numbers of individuals, these two values are nearly identical. 
Because most current empirical studies of dominance struc-
ture use a modified version of Landau’s method (denoted h′: 
de Vries 1995), we will focus on comparisons between h′ and 
our metric ttri. Nevertheless, an overview of the earlier linear-
ity indices is instructive for purposes of distinguishing them 
from our index of triangle transitivity.
Kendall’s K is defined as the proportion of cyclic triads ob-
served (d), relative to the maximum possible number of cycles 
(Kendall & Babington Smith 1940). For a group of N individu-
als, the dominant–subordinate relations are summarized in a 
N × N matrix of dominance scores. For convenience, we will use 
Appleby’s (1983) criteria for scoring in the dominance matrix. 
Individuals that win more than 50% of encounters in each dyad 
receive a score of 1 in its row at the column position of the sub-
ordinate. If both individuals win an equal number of encoun-
ters, each receives a score of 0.5 in its respective row–column 
positions. Other criteria for assigning dominance scores are pos-
sible. The most appropriate criteria depend on the research sub-
jects and the questions addressed. For each individual i, Si is the 
row sum (dominance total) of these scores. Subordinance to-
tals are given by the column sums. Kendall & Babington Smith 
(1940) showed that the number of cyclic triads is
            d = N(N – 1) (2N – 1)   –  ½ ∑ (Si)2      (1)                                12 
The maximum number of cyclic triads possible among N indi-
viduals is
            {    dmax = 1/24 (N3 – N)     for odd values of N                            dmax = 1/24 (N3 – 4N)   for even values of N     (2)
Given these,
           K = 1 –   d
                        dmax     (3)
Thus, K is an index of the frequency of cyclic triads relative 
to the maximum possible. K = 1 when no cyclic triads exist, 
and K = 0 when the number of cyclic triads is maximal. Note 
that the dependence of the measure on whether N is odd or 
even makes this measure problematic for comparing linearity 
across groups of differing size.
Landau’s (1951a) approach is based on the variance in 
dominance among individuals. Maximum variance occurs 
when the hierarchy is completely linear. Using the same nota-
tion as above, Landau’s (1951a) hierarchy index is defined as
         
h =
        12       N∑ [Si – N – 1 ]
2
                  N3 – N   i=1             2              (4)
The value of h also ranges from 0 to 1, with h = 1 being perfect 
linearity. Values of K and h are equal for odd-sized groups but 
differ slightly for even-sized groups.
Both Kendall’s K and Landau’s h are derived from analy-
ses of tournaments. When null dyads occur, K and h are bi-
ased towards underestimating linearity ( Appleby, 1983; de 
Vries, 1995). Currently, a randomization procedure is com-
monly used whereby dominant (1) versus subordinate (0) 
scores are randomly imputed to the members of each null 
dyad. An h value is calculated for this ‘filled’ dominance 
matrix, and the modified Landau’s h (denoted as h′) is the 
average h value of 10 000 randomly filled matrices (de 
Vries 1995). This is also the first randomization step in the 
statistical test advocated by de Vries (1995), which is de-
scribed later (see Statistical Test of Linearity and Triangle 
Transitivity).
Calculating the Index of Triangle Transitivity, ttri
Our method for measuring triangle transitivity, ttri, is based 
on direct enumeration of the triad types without resorting to 
randomly filling in null dyads. The matrix of dyadic domi-
nance relations is directly equivalent to a network adjacency 
matrix (Wasserman & Faust 1994), with the slight modifica-
tion that when two individuals win the same number of con-
tests against each other, they both receive scores of 1 instead of 
0.5. In the corresponding network diagram, a dominant–sub-
ordinate relation (asymmetric dyad) is represented by an edge 
(arrow) directed from the dominant to the subordinate node 
(individual). Null dyads lack a connecting edge. Mutual dy-
ads (two-way arrows), in which both individuals win the same 
number of contests, are very rare in dominance data sets (on 
average, 2.2% of dyadic relations were mutual in our sample 
of 101 empirical networks; Supplementary material, Table S1). 
Moreover, mutual dyads are necessarily transient states, and 
can occur only when the dyad has interacted an even num-
ber of times. From a methodological standpoint, mutual dyads 
and null dyads are similar: they both represent an unresolved 
dyadic relation such that one additional interaction would cre-
ate an asymmetrical dyad. A more comprehensive treatment 
of the transitive dynamics of dominance relation would need 
to account for such complications, but this is beyond the scope 
of the current study. Here, we first discuss the measurement of 
triangle transitivity in networks that contains no mutual dy-
ads. We do so because it results in a greatly simplified triad 
census (Holland & Leinhardt 1976) of seven rather than 16 
types, without affecting any of our conclusions. This will al-
low us to present our approach in its simplest form. However, 
the approach can be extended to include networks with mu-
tual dyads, and we discuss the calculation of the triangle tran-
sitivity in networks with mutual dyads in the Appendix.
A directed network with only asymmetric or null dyads 
has seven distinct (nonisomprphic) types of triads (Figure 1; 
see Figure A1 for the 16 types possible with mutual edges; 
Holland and Leinhardt, 1976; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Each combination of three nodes (e.g. 165 triads in an 11-an-
imal group) is distributed across these seven possible types. 
The triad census is implemented in network analysis pack-
ages in R (e.g. statnet: Handcock et al. 2003; igraph: Csárdi & 
Nepusz 2006). Of the seven triad types, we focus particularly 
on the two triangles (i.e. triads connected by three edges): the 
transitive and cyclic triangles. The proportion of transitive tri-
angles relative to all triangles (Pt) is given by
          
Pt =
           Ntransitive         
                     Ntransitive + Ncycle           (5)
  
where Ntransitive is the number of transitive triangles, and 
Ncycle is the number of cyclic triangles. Codes for calculating 
Pt using the statnet package (Handcock et al. 2003) in R (R De-
velopment Core Team 2009) are presented in the Supplemen-
tary material.
In random networks, Pt is expected to equal 0.75. This 
property can be demonstrated intuitively by considering all 
possible triangle configurations between three individuals A, 
B and C (Figure 2; Appleby 1983). Of eight possible configu-
rations, six, or 75%, are transitive. A mathematical derivation, 
based on the expected frequencies for random networks (Hol-
land & Leinhardt 1976) is given in the Appendix. Furthermore, 
the result is easily shown by simulation of a large sample of 
random networks and calculating Pt.
With an expected value of Pt = 0.75, we can scale transitiv-
ity so that it runs from 0 for the random expectation to 1 (all 
triangles are transitive, no cycles). Our triangle transitivity 
metric, ttri, is then given by
928 Sh i z u k a & McDo n al D i n Ani m A l Beh A vi ou r  83 (2012) 
ttri = 4(Pt − 0.75)                                                               (6)
Note that ttri could be negative if more cyclic triangles oc-
curred than would be expected in a random network. Em-
pirical data sets rarely have ttri values that are negative, and 
even then the values are always close to 0 (Supplementary 
Table S1).
Triangle transitivity, ttri, can also be calculated for each it-
eration of the ‘random fill’ process as described by de Vries 
(1995; see Calculating Measures of Linearity). We will refer 
to the average transitivity from these ‘filled’ networks as t′tri. 
Comparing h′ and t′tri allows us to directly compare the value 
of linearity and transitivity in imputed networks. Comparing 
values of t′tri from imputed matrices and ttri from the raw data 
allows us to disentangle the effect of the imputation procedure 
itself on measures of dominance structure.
Statistical Analysis of Linearity and Triangle Transitivity
A two-step randomization procedure advocated by de 
Vries (1995) is the predominant statistical test of significant 
linearity. In the first step, one imputes a random dominance 
relation to all null dyads and then calculates an initial linear-
ity, h0. In the second step, all dyadic dominant–subordinate re-
lations are randomized. The linearity of this randomized ma-
trix is hr. These two values, h0 and hr, are compared with each 
other. Steps 1 and 2 are repeated 10 000 times; the one-tailed 
P value is the proportion of randomizations for which hr ≥ h0. 
In essence, this procedure compares the linearity of an em-
pirical, although imputed, matrix with the expected linearity 
from random matrices of the same size. The average value of 
h0 from the 10 000 simulations is the h′ index (see Calculating 
Measures of Linearity).
To assess the significance of our transitivity metric we 
use logic similar to that of de Vries (1995), but the procedure 
is conducted without imputing null dyads. In network the-
ory, this is called a conditional uniform graph approach (Was-
serman and Faust, 1994; Faust, 2010). First, we generate 1000 
dyad census-conditioned random graphs; these random net-
works simulate the dominance structure for hypothesized 
groups of the same number of individuals and same number 
of observed dominance relationships, but with uniform prob-
ability for each individual dominating any other individual. 
We then compare the range of triangle transitivity values in 
these random graphs (trandom) to the empirical value, ttri. The 
one-tailed P value is the proportion of times trandom ≥ empirical 
ttri. The application of this procedure for networks with mu-
tual dyads is discussed in the Appendix. In the Supplemen-
tary material, we provide the codes for conducting this proce-
dure using the statnet package (Handcock et al. 2003) in R (R 
Development Core Team 2009).
Comparing Transitivity and Linearity in Random Networks
To assess the effects of network size on measures of linear-
ity and transitivity, we simulated random tournaments (i.e. 
networks composed entirely of asymmetrical dyads) of vary-
ing sizes (range 5–50 nodes), with 1000 replicates for each net-
work size. For replicate random tournaments of a given size, 
we measured the mean and confidence intervals of h and Pt. 
Note that in tournaments, there are no null dyads to impute, 
so h′ = h. Similarly, in tournaments, Pt = 1 represents a com-
pletely linear hierarchy because all dyads have a dominant–
subordinate relationship, and all dominance relations are tran-
sitive. To determine the range of possible Pt values, we also 
calculated the minimum value of Pt possible in each set of sim-
ulations using
               
Pt min = 1 –
           dmax
                    Ntransitive + Ncycle                                           (7)
          
where dmax is the maximum number of cyclic triangles, as de-
fined by equation (2). This calculation only applies to tourna-
ments (Kendall & Babington Smith 1940), as we do not know 
of any algorithm for calculating the minimum number of tran-
sitive triads in sparse networks.
We also investigated the effect of network sparseness 
(proportion of dyads that are null) on values of Pt by con-
structing random networks of constant size (20 nodes) but 
of varying sparseness (range 0–0.9), and plotting the means 
and confidence intervals of Pt for 1000 replicates of each 
level of network sparseness. To match the one-tailed sta-
tistical test of linearity and triangle transitivity, our confi-
dence interval represents 0 to 95th percentile of h and ttri 
values in all of our random networks. Values that are out-
side this range would be considered statistically significant 
at α = 0.05.
Comparing Transitivity and Linearity in Empirical Networks
We collected 101 matrices containing raw win–loss totals 
from 55 studies published in peer-reviewed journals (Supple-
mentary Table S1). These included studies on invertebrates, 
fish, birds and mammals, with group size ranging from 6 to 
45 individuals. We excluded matrices of five or fewer individ-
uals, and those with fewer than two interactions per individ-
ual. Some studies included multiple matrices (either obser-
vations of different groups or of the same group at different 
times), and we included all available matrices that fit our cri-
teria. Although the sample is not exhaustive, it covers a wide 
range of taxa and hierarchical structures. We first analyse em-
pirical networks in which we exclude mutual dyads because 
they are rare and pose theoretical complications (see Calcu-
lating the Index of Triangle Transitivity above). In the Appen-
dix, we present the method of calculating triangle transitiv-
ity in networks with mutual dyads, and show that excluding 
mutual dyads has negligible effects on the measure of trian-
gle transitivity.
We calculated linearity and triangle transitivity indi-
ces from randomly filled dominance matrices (h′ and t′tri, 
respectively), using the procedure described in de Vries 
(1995; see “Calculating Measures of Linearity” and “Calcu-
lating the Index of Triangle Transitivity,” above). We imple-
mented the randomization routine in R. We then calculated 
the scaled index of triangle transitivity (ttri) from empirical 
matrices using only the raw data presented in the publica-
tions (see Supplementary material for codes written in R). 
Finally, we calculated the P values associated with statisti-
cal tests of h′ and ttri from the empirical data using the pro-
cedure outlined above (see Statistical Test of Linearity and 
Transitivity).
Figure 2. All eight possible patterns of dominant–subordinate re-
lations between individuals A, B and C. Triangles to the left of the 
dashed line are transitive and those on the right are cyclic. Six of 
eight, or 75%, of possible triangles are transitive.
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General Statistical Methods
We investigated the effects of network size and network 
sparseness on measures of linearity and triangle transitivity 
using linear regression. Network size was log transformed, 
and network sparseness was arcsine square root transformed 
to conform to normality assumptions for linear regression. All 
statistical and simulation procedures were conducted in R.
Results
Triangle Transitivity and Linearity in Random Networks
We first evaluated how network size (number of individu-
als in the group) affected the random expected values of h and 
Pt (Figure 3a, b). We confirmed that network size affected the 
h estimate of linearity in random tournaments: the expected 
Figure 3. Values of linearity and transitivity in simulated random networks. Symbols represent mean values of (a) h or (b) Pt from 1000 simu-
lated random tournaments of varying sizes, or (c) mean values of Pt from 1000 simulated random networks of N = 20 individuals and varying 
sparseness. We did not calculate h in sparse networks. Lines represent the 0 to 95th percentile of h and Pt values for replicate simulated net-
works of each size or density. Dotted line represents h = 0 in (a), and Pt = 0.75 in (b, c). In (b), the horizontal bars represent the minimum level 
of transitivity possible in a tournament of a given size, calculated by equation (7). Average values of Landau’s h change with network size, but 
average values of Pt do not change with network size or sparseness. Variance of both h and Pt decrease with increasing network size, and vari-
ance of Pt also increases in networks with more null dyads. Minimum levels of transitivity in sparse networks cannot be calculated analyti-
cally. Small, sparse networks are not amenable to statistical tests of social structure because the variance in expected values is large, and even 
perfect linearity or transitivity would not differ significantly from random.
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values of h decreased with increasing group size (Figure 3a: 
Landau 1951a). In contrast, the average proportion of transi-
tive triads (Pt) remained constant at 0.75 over various network 
sizes (Figure 3b). The 95% confidence intervals shown in Fig-
ure 3 illustrate the range of h and Pt values that could arise 
by chance (for one-tailed tests at α = 0.05). The confidence in-
terval is larger for smaller tournaments, and includes h = 1 or 
Pt = 1 in tournaments of five individuals, showing that per-
fectly linear hierarchies often arise by chance in very small 
groups. Similarly, the average value of Pt also stayed con-
stant at 0.75 at different levels of network sparseness, but the 
95% confidence interval increased when the network was very 
sparse (Figure 3c).
The change in expected values of h also means that the in-
terpretation of dominance structure at a given value of h could 
vary depending on group size. For example, h = 0.4 at N = 5 
individuals is not significantly different from the random ex-
pectation, but h = 0.4 at N = 40 would be considered signifi-
cantly linear.
In summary, while the statistical probability of a given 
value of h and Pt arising by chance are both affected by net-
work size, only Pt serves as a reliable indicator of the sign 
(positive or negative) of the orderliness of dominance struc-
ture relative to random expectation. In particular, Pt > 0.75 
always indicates that there are more transitive triangles 
than the null expectation. We therefore scale our index of 
triangle transitivity, ttri (equation 6), relative to 0.75. How-
ever, the magnitude of the ttri value is not necessarily in-
formative as a statistical index in and of itself because the 
confidence intervals around this expected value vary with 
network size and density.
Triangle Transitivity and Linearity in Empirical Networks
To determine whether linearity and triangle transitivity 
measures yield fundamentally different estimates of social 
structure, we simultaneously calculated h′ and t′tri from 10 000 
replicates of each of the 101 empirical data sets whose null dy-
ads we filled randomly. The objective was to compare the in-
dices under the same conditions of random filling. The linear-
ity and transitivity indices were tightly correlated (Pearson’s 
correlation: r99 = 0.98, N = 101 matrices, P < 0.001), but the 
best-fit curve to explain the relationship between the two mea-
sures was nonlinear (second-degree polynomial: y = −0.02 + 0.
35 × x + 0.70 × x2; Supplementary Figure S1). The nonlinear re-
lationship means that the two indices are not interchangeable. 
The nonlinearity is most likely the result of how the values of 
the two indices differ in response to changing network size 
(Figure 3a, b). To support this claim, linear regression with h′, 
but with network size included as a covariate, explained 99% 
of the variation in the value of t′tri (F3,97 = 4286, R2adj = 0.99, 
P < 0.001), a significantly better fit compared to the model 
that did not include network size (Wald test: F2,98 = 254.6, 
P < 0.001; linear model without network size: F1,99 = 2016, R2adj 
= 0.95, P < 0.001). That result suggests that under the same 
constraints (i.e. when all dyads are randomly assigned a dom-
inance relation and when network size is included as a covari-
ate), t′tri and h′ are essentially equivalent measures.
We then compared triangle transitivity, ttri, from empiri-
cal networks with unmanipulated null dyads, with t′tri, where 
null dyads were randomly filled. Comparing ttri and t′tri al-
lowed us to investigate the effect of the random-fill imputation 
procedure used in calculating the h′ linearity index.
The triangle transitivity, ttri, in the unmodified dominance 
data sets was greater than  t′tri in the randomly filled data, in-
dicating that the imputation procedure leads to overly conser-
vative estimates of orderliness (mean ± SE: ttri = 0.88 ± 0.02; 















































Figure 4a). The reduction in triangle transitivity associated 
with imputation is related to the proportion of null dyads (lin-
ear regression: F1,99 = 304.1, R2adj = 0.75, P < 0.001; Figure 4b). 
Of the 101 data sets, 88 (87%) contained at least one null dyad, 
and the proportion of null dyads (mean ± SE = 0.26 ± 0.02) 
was positively correlated with the number of individuals 
(Pearson’s correlation: r99 = 0.46, N = 101, P < 0.001). More-
over, 33 (33%) of the 101 data sets contained no cyclic triads 
(Pt = ttri = 1), while only four of the 101 had an h value of 1. 
Thus, filling in null dyads artificially creates cyclic triads and 
systematically underestimates orderliness. Because null dyads 
tend to be more abundant in studies of larger groups, the ap-
parent decrease in linearity with increasing group size is most 
likely an artefact of the imputation procedure used in calculat-
ing h′.
We used linear regression to confirm that group size and 
proportion of null dyads alone explain most of the variation 
in the linearity metric, h′ (full model with network size and 
sparseness as covariates: F3,100 = 149.2, R2adj = 0.82, P < 0.001). 
Specifically, estimated linearity decreases with increasing net-
work size or sparseness (Supplementary Figure S2a, b). In 
contrast, our transitivity metric, ttri, was unaffected by either 
Figure 4. Randomly filling in null dyads reduces the transitivity 
value of social dominance networks. (a) Comparison of filled ver-
sus raw dominance networks shows that triangle transitivity in ran-
domly filled networks (ttri′) is systematically lower than when tri-
angle transitivity is calculated without manipulating the data (ttri). 
(b) Amount of discrepancy between imputed and raw networks is 
explained by the proportion of dyads that were imputed. Note that 
some overlapping data points exist.































network size or sparseness (Supplementary Figure S2c, d; lin-
ear regression, full model with size and sparseness as covari-
ates: F3,100 = 0.32, R2adj = –0.02, P = 0.81). Therefore, it is prob-
ably a more unbiased measure of social orderliness that is 
amenable to comparisons across studies.
The imputed metric of linearity, h′, could lead to vari-
ous misinterpretations of social orderliness in animal groups. 
While the P values derived from the linearity and transitivity 
procedures were correlated (Pearson’s correlation: r99 = 0.85, 
N = 101, P < 0.001), the P values for linearity were larger (i.e. 
less significant) than those for triangle transitivity (Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test: Z = −7.4, P < 0.01; Figure 5), suggesting that 
imputation-based linearity underestimates the threshold for 
significant social orderliness. Thus, 15 of the 101 data sets in 
which the linearity failed to detect significant structure were 
deemed significantly nonrandom using triangle transitivity 
(α = 0.05), whereas only one data set was significantly linear 
but marginally nonsignificant with triangle transitivity (Fig-
ure 5). Some studies, especially those with large, sparse ma-
trices, might therefore conclude that groups contain no signif-
icant hierarchical structure if relying on the linearity index, h′, 
even when the triadic relationships that actually exist are dis-
proportionately transitive.
Discussion
In this study, we define triangle transitivity (ttri) as a scaled 
index of the relative frequency of transitive triads among all tri-
angles (closed triads) in a dominance network. This allows us to 
ask the question: of the three-way dominance relationships we 
actually observed, what proportion of these are transitive rather 
than cyclic? Our method is based on the triad census, a network 
analysis tool that allows us to count the frequencies all triadic 
configurations in the network. We show that in tournaments of 
the same size, ttri and the linearity index h both describe the de-
gree to which triadic relations are transitive. Discrepancies be-
tween measures of linearity and triangle transitivity can arise 
when null dyads occur, with the linearity metric, h′, becoming 
increasingly conservative with the proportion of null dyads. 
This is because the imputation procedure used to calculate lin-
earity of incomplete networks (h′) creates triangles that do not 
exist in the observed data set, thus obscuring the actual trian-
gle relationships that occurred. This effect is magnified with in-
creasing group size because large matrices are more likely to be 
sparse. Sparse networks are ubiquitous: in our sample, 87% of 
dominance networks had at least one null dyad, and on aver-
age 26% of dyads were null. Of the 43 of 101 data sets in which 
ttri equalled 1, only four were complete tournaments that could 
be considered unequivocally linear. We determined that 15 
dominance hierarchies that had significantly high levels of tri-
angle transitivity would not be considered significantly linear 
using the h′ criterion (Figure 5). We argue that dominance rela-
tions in these groups are nonrandomly transitive. The decrease 
in h′ associated with increasing group size is therefore largely 
explained by two factors: the average value of h in random-
ized networks decreases with increasing group size, and large 
groups tend to contain more null dyads. In effect, social dynam-
ics at the level of triads seems relatively unaffected by overall 
group size, such that triangle transitivity often remains high 
even in large groups. Thus, our findings emphasize even more 
strongly than heretofore appreciated the striking orderliness of 
most animal societies.
In the current study, we have scaled the triangle transitiv-
ity index relative to the null expected value. This scaling pro-
cedure presents some advantages and drawbacks. The ma-
jor advantage of the ttri index is that it is scaled relative to a 
value that is constant regardless of network size or sparseness. 
The expected value of ttri is always 0, and the maximum value 
is 1, in all directed networks. Negative values of the ttri index 
are possible, but the exact minimum value, which will vary 
with network size and sparseness, is unknown. In the current 
study, we simply scaled ttri so as to be positive when triangles 
were more frequently transitive than average, and we scaled 
ttri to be negative when triangles were more frequently cyclic 
than the random expectation. The effect of network size and 
density on the bounds of indices of network structure is a gen-
eral problem in network theory ( Butts, 2006; Faust, 2010), and 
further work is needed to define precisely the bounds of trian-
gle transitivity in sparse networks.
Our approach complements, but does not replace, other 
approaches to understanding the structure of dominance hi-
erarchies. For example, we followed convention and assigned 
dominant–subordinate relations based on which individual 
won more than 50% of encounters, but this is most likely an 
oversimplification. Methods such as the directional consis-
tency index (van Hooff & Wensing 1987), a measure of how 
consistently one individual wins against another individual, 
may be useful for investigating the stability of dyadic rela-
tions. Moreover, there are other important dynamics of dom-
inance relations that are not captured by the triangle transitiv-
ity metric. For example, even when all triangles are transitive 
(Pt = ttri = 1), longer-range cycles (e.g. A > B > C > D > A) could 
occur, and these individuals cannot be arranged in orderly 
dominance ranks. Nevertheless, we focus on triads because 
it is the smallest unit of transitivity, and because the analysis 
of triads has been well established ( Holland and Leinhardt, 
1976; Faust, 2007) and it offers ready comparison with existing 
measures of linearity. Other, more comprehensive network 
methods to analyse dominance data may be appropriate for 
some questions (Iverson & Sade 1990). One such example is 
the dominance-directed tree method for generating graphical 
representations of nonlinear hierarchies (Izar et al. 2006). Sim-
ilarly, more sophisticated measures of social structure that in-
corporate temporal and spatial dynamics are possible ( White-
head, 1997; Hemelrijk, 2000). Such dynamics are also central to 
network theory as well as studies of animal dominance.
Figure 5. Comparison of P values from linearity and transitivity 
measures. Statistical analysis of linearity followed de Vries (1995). 
Solid line is a 1:1 line, and dotted lines indicate α = 0.05 for each 
axis. Imputed linearity often underestimates the statistical signif-
icance of social orderliness. Of 101 empirical dominance networks 
analysed, 15 that would have been interpreted as nonlinear actually 
had significant levels of transitivity at α = 0.05 (one-tailed simula-
tion test for both). Note that some overlapping data points exist.
932 Sh i z u k a & McDo n al D i n Ani m A l Beh A vi ou r  83 (2012) 
A major question remains: why do some pairs estab-
lish clear dominance relations while other pairs fail to inter-
act? If patterns of noninteractions are not random, then this 
could bias the formation of transitive versus cyclic triangles. 
For example, if two individuals can infer their relative domi-
nance status without interactions (e.g. via long-distance social 
signals), then individuals may avoid interacting with others 
when they are more likely to become entangled in an irresolv-
able cyclic triad. Third-party effects such as eavesdropping 
(Earley and Dugatkin, 2002; Mennill and Ratcliffe, 2004) can 
also affect whether certain individuals interact aggressively 
or avoid each other. Alternatively, some dyadic interactions 
may not be worth the cost of aggression, for example, if two 
similarly low-ranked individuals gain little benefit from out-
ranking each other. With third-party effects and high-stakes 
contests, some individuals may avoid forming transitive tri-
angles because the probable outcome of the contest is inferred 
through previous observations. Spatial segregation or other 
mechanisms that make it impossible for two individuals to in-
teract (called structural zeros in de Vries 1995) would also af-
fect which triads are closed, but whether this would bias trian-
gle transitivity is not immediately clear. Theoretical models of 
the ecological and evolutionary processes that lead to partic-
ular patterns of ‘triad closure’ (Rapoport, 1953; Kossinets and 
Watts, 2006) will be important avenues of research to under-
stand how highly transitive social dominance networks arise. 
Regardless of what mechanisms mediate competitive interac-
tions, we suggest that patterns of noninteractions are critical to 
understanding social organization.
Social dominance is a dynamic process, and a network ap-
proach provides an opportunity to explore how social structure 
changes across time (Kossinets & Watts 2006). Early sequences 
of dominance interactions can have profound effects on later 
interactions, as well as the global structure of the dominance 
network (e.g. winner and loser effects: Landau, 1951b; Dugat-
kin, 1997). For example, Chase (1982b) showed that in chick-
ens, the potential levels of transitivity were largely determined 
by the early sequences of triadic interactions (i.e. when two out 
of the three dyads in a triad had established dominance rela-
tions). That is, two-edge configurations that ensured transitivity 
(i.e. ‘Double-dominant’ and ‘Double-subordinate’ in Figure 1) 
were more common than the only two-edge configuration that 
could potentially lead to cycles (i.e. ‘Pass-along’ in Figure 1). 
This imbalance between transitive and cyclic precursors at the 
two-edge stage formed the basis of the sequential develop-
ment model of hierarchy formation (Chase, 1982b, 1985; Chase 
and Rohwer, 1987). The triad census provides a way to explore 
these dynamics efficiently on the level of the entire network 
through time. Because social interactions can often be observed 
in real time, sequential analyses of network structure should be 
a promising approach to connect these important lower-level 
processes (Faust 2007) to the patterns of hierarchical organiza-
tion in dominance relations.
In general, the study of dominance hierarchies fits into 
a broad context of structure and transitivity in networks, a 
topic that unites physics, sociology, biology and other disci-
plines (Rapoport, 1953; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Milo et al., 
2002; Barabási, 2009). Network analyses play an important and 
increasing role in exploring the structure of animal societies 
(Krause et al., 2007; Wey et al., 2007; Sih et al., 2009). We antic-
ipate that observations of nonhuman animal social systems in 
natural and experimental contexts will have much to contrib-
ute to the general understanding of the processes that lead to 
orderly social structures in nature.
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Appendix 1. 
Deriving the Expected Value of Pt in Random Networks
In this study, we use a simulation approach to generate the 
distribution of Pt under the assumption of random dominance 
relations. The distributions of expected frequencies of triadic 
configurations for random graphs conditioned on the number 
of mutual, asymmetrical and null dyads (termed U|MAN dis-
tribution) was derived by Holland & Leinhardt (1976). We can 
use this to simply derive the average expected value of Pt: the 
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E(030T) = ¾
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where E(030T) and E(030C) are expected frequencies of transitive 
and cyclic triangles, A is the number of asymmetrical edges in 
the network, and k is the number of dyads in network g. The 
notation z(3) stands for z × (z − 1) × (z − 2). The expected value 
of Pt in random networks, E(Pt) is then:
E(Pt) =
         E(030T)             =
  3
               E(030T) + E(030C)         4                  (A3)
Therefore, the expected average proportion of transitive trian-
gles in a directed network is 0.75. This is confirmed indepen-
dently in the main text using simulations and by a heuristic ar-
gument for the six transitive triads among the eight possible 
ways of adding three edges to a given triad (see Results and 
Figure 2).
Appendix 2. 
Calculating Pt in Networks with Mutual Dyads
In the analysis presented in the main text, we excluded mu-
tual dyads (dyads in which both individuals win the same 
number of contests) because these dyads are rare and have 
only slight effects on measurements of triad transitivity. How-
ever, our approach is easily extended to include dominance 
networks with mutual dyads.
We first consider the seven different triangle configurations 
that are possible in networks with mutual, asymmetrical and 
null dyads (indicated in black in Figure A1). Following Hol-
land & Leinhardt (1976), each triad configuration is labelled 
with a three-number code representing the number of mu-
tual, asymmetric and null dyads (Figure A1). When applica-
ble, a fourth character is used to denote distinct configurations 
that share the same frequencies of dyad types (‘D’ = down, 
‘U’ = up, ‘C’ = cycle, ‘T’ = transitive). For example, a transi-
tive triad has no mutual dyads, three asymmetrical dyads and 
no null dyads, so it is labelled as ‘030T’. This is distinguished 
from a cyclic triad that also contains only three asymmetrical 
dyads, labelled ‘030C’. This labelling scheme is referred to as 
MAN labelling (for mutual, aymmetric and null dyads: Was-
serman & Faust 1994).
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Triads that contain mutual dyads are weighted according 
to the probability that the configuration is transitive if the mu-
tual dyad becomes a dominant–subordinate relation (Holland 
and Leinhardt, 1976; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This is akin 
to the treatment of mutual dyads in measuring linearity (Ap-
pleby, 1983; de Vries, 1995): both individuals are considered to 
have equal chance of being dominant. For example, triad 120C 
is weighted by a value of 0.5; the triad may be transitive or in-
transitive, depending on which member of the mutual dyad 
dominates, with both scenarios equally probable. Further-
more, 120D and 120U are transitive no matter which individ-
ual in the mutual dyad is dominant, so this is weighted by a 
value of 1. Triad types 210 and 300 are weighted by 0.75 using 
the same logic. The weighting factors (wu) of all triad types are 
presented in Figure A1. Note that Pt cannot be measured if no 
triangle triads occur.
Applying these transitivity weights to each triad configura-
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where Tu is the frequency of triad type u, and wu is the 
weighting factor for transitivity for triad u. Ntriangles is the to-
tal number of triangles in the network. The ttri index can be 
calculated by taking this Pt value and applying equation (6). 
The Pt values calculated for empirical networks including or 
excluding mutual dyads were highly correlated (r99 = 0.92, 
N = 101, P < 0.001), and the mean difference in value was 
0.006. Therefore, excluding the mutual dyads, at least in this 
sample of 101 data sets, did not change our results. However, 
in other networks where mutual dyads are more common, 
this equation (A1) may be a more appropriate method of cal-
culating Pt.
The statistical procedure for generating a P value for the 
triangle transitivity of an empirical network is the same as 
outlined in the main text. For each empirical network, we 
generate 1000 dyad census-conditioned random graphs and 
calculate ttri for each. The one-tailed P value is the number 
of times the ttri value of the random network is greater than 
the ttri value of the empirical network. In the Supplemen-
tary Material, we provide the codes for conducting this pro-
cedure in R.
Figure A1. Full triad census, showing all 16 triad configurations possible in a directed network. Each configuration is named using the MAN 
labelling scheme (see text; Holland & Leinhardt 1976). Seven triangle configurations, in which all three nodes are connected by either asym-
metric or mutual edges, are shown in black. Weighting factor (wu) for each of the seven triangle configuration types is based on the probabil-
ity that the triangle is transitive, with the assumption that each individual in a mutual dyad has equal probability of being dominant. Using 




Calculation and Statistical Test of Triangle Transitivity 
 
 Here, we provide the codes to calculate Pt and ttri and to conduct a statistical test of triangle transitivity of an 
empirical network using the package ‘statnet’ (Handcock et al. 2003) in the R programming environment (R 
Development Core Team 2009). The following codes calculate Pt and ttri in networks using the methods described in 




E) # read .csv file containing the dominance matrix in binary format 





# We calculate P.t and t.tri for this empirical network. 
 
tri=triad.census(g) #The full triad census as an 16-element vector  
w=as.vector(c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0.5,0.75,0.75)) # The weighting 
vector for transitivity  
N.triangle=sum(tri*as.vector(c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,1))) #Count 







## We now conduct 1,000 simulations of random networks with the same 
number of mutual, asymmetric and null dyads as the empirical 








# Finally, we conduct a one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that 
P.t of the empirical network is not significantly different from P.t 
of the simulated random networks (r.P.t). The P-value is the number 
of times r.P.t is greater or equal to the empirical P.t value. By 
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Source  Network    Pt  ttri  ttri'  h'    P value 
Size  Sparseness      h'  ttri 
Allee & Dickinson 1954,  Table 3  10  0.378    1.000  1.000  0.533  0.661    0.012  0.000 
Appleby 1983,  Figure 1  7  0.381    1.000  1.000  0.543  0.714    0.098  0.152 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (GB)  11  0.545    1.000  1.000  0.115  0.335    0.311  0.033 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (A)  8  0.214    1.000  1.000  0.500  0.666    0.094  0.005 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (AA)  10  0.556    1.000  1.000  0.242  0.449    0.174  0.079 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (CB)  6  0.067    1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000    0.021  0.033 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (FB)  6  0.133    1.000  1.000  0.450  0.688    0.258  0.057 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (JA)  7  0.429    1.000  1.000  0.457  0.662    0.168  0.213 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (OA)  9  0.611    1.000  1.000  0.131  0.394    0.354  0.350 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (PC)  9  0.667    1.000  1.000  0.155  0.407    0.324  0.484 
Archie et al. 2006,  Figure 2 (SI)  6  0.067    1.000  1.000  0.900  0.943    0.036  0.046 
Barrette & Vandal 1986,  Table 2  20  0.058    0.981  0.922  0.816  0.840    0.000  0.000 
Berman et al. 2004,  Appendix A  22  0.203    0.992  0.970  0.646  0.692    0.000  0.000 
Berman et al. 2004,  Appendix B  22  0.281    0.997  0.987  0.583  0.637    0.000  0.000 
Berman et al. 2004,  Appendix C  18  0.124    0.984  0.936  0.734  0.774    0.000  0.000 
Bonanni et al. 2007,  Table 1  13  0.282    0.933  0.733  0.304  0.448    0.025  0.000 
Bonanni et al. 2007,  Table 2  14  0.374    0.990  0.960  0.462  0.567    0.000  0.000 
Cafazzo et al. 2010,  Table 5  27  0.231    0.994  0.978  0.584  0.627    0.000  0.000 
Cheney 1977, Table 1a  12  0.000    1.000  1.000  1.000  0.997    0.000  0.000 
Cheney 1977, Table 1b  12  0.015    0.958  0.833  0.736  0.790    0.000  0.000 
Clutton‐Brock et al. 1976,  Table 3  17  0.051    1.000  1.000  0.847  0.868    0.000  0.000 
Collias & Taber 1951,  Table 3  9  0.583    1.000  1.000  0.167  0.415    0.300  0.260 
Collias Taber 1951,  Table 4  8  0.464    1.000  1.000  0.161  0.430    0.325  0.097 
Collias Taber 1951,  Table 5  14  0.440    0.905  0.619  0.203  0.363    0.071  0.002 
Source  Network    Pt  ttri  ttri'  h'    P value 
Size  Sparseness      h'  ttri 
Côté 2000,  Table A1  38  0.408    0.986  0.943  0.301  0.354    0.000  0.000 
Côté 2000,  Table A2  40  0.531    0.994  0.976  0.183  0.242    0.000  0.000 
Côté 2000,  Table A3  45  0.549    0.997  0.989  0.189  0.241    0.000  0.000 
Côté 2000,  Table A4  45  0.486    0.989  0.957  0.230  0.280    0.000  0.000 
Farentinos 1972,  Table 1A  6  0.267    1.000  1.000  0.500  0.714    0.209  0.157 
Farentinos 1972,  Table 1B  8  0.286    0.913  0.652  0.304  0.524    0.172  0.045 
Farentinos 1972,  Table 1C  8  0.607    0.800  0.200  0.000  0.320    0.519  0.641 
Farentinos 1972,  Table 1D  11  0.436    0.971  0.882  0.309  0.473    0.067  0.007 
Farentinos 1972,  Table 1E  6  0.000    0.950  0.800  0.800  0.886    0.051  0.058 
Fournier & Festa‐Bianchet 1995,  Figure 3  30  0.556    0.967  0.868  0.162  0.242    0.000  0.000 
Fournier 1995 & Festa‐Bianchet,  Figure 2  21  0.590    0.920  0.682  0.129  0.247    0.048  0.000 
Frank 1986,  Table 1  25  0.797    1.000  1.000  0.086  0.191    0.072  0.008 
Hartzler 1970,  Table 1  7  0.095    1.000  1.000  0.914  0.946    0.007  0.005 
Hass & Jenni 1991,  Table 1  15  0.733    1.000  1.000  0.105  0.274    0.204  0.123 
Hass & Jenni 1991,  Table 2  18  0.497    1.000  1.000  0.159  0.291    0.063  0.000 
Hass & Jenni 1991,  Table 3  17  0.500    1.000  1.000  0.191  0.327    0.041  0.000 
Heitor & Vicente 2010,  Table 2  6  0.000    1.000  1.000  0.850  0.857    0.049  0.021 
Heitor et al. 2006,  Table 3  11  0.000    0.964  0.855  0.855  0.891    0.000  0.000 
Hewitt et al. 2009,  Figure A1 (SH1995)  14  0.440    0.959  0.837  0.258  0.393    0.038  0.000 
Hewitt et al. 2009,  Figure A1 (P2004)  7  0.000    1.000  1.000  0.943  0.929    0.005  0.000 
Hewitt et al. 2009,  Figure A1 (PO2004)  7  0.238    0.950  0.800  0.371  0.607    0.206  0.026 
Hewitt et al. 2009,  Figure A1 (P2005)  9  0.222    0.952  0.810  0.548  0.683    0.018  0.003 
Hirotani 1994,  Table 1  13  0.090    0.976  0.904  0.836  0.868    0.000  0.000 
Isbell & Pruet 1998,  Figure 1A  9  0.306    1.000  1.000  0.452  0.615    0.057  0.001 
Isbell & Pruet 1998,  Figure 1B  17  0.493    0.882  0.527  0.128  0.265    0.111  0.002 
Izar et al. 2006,  Table 2  17  0.338    1.000  1.000  0.499  0.580    0.000  0.000 
Koenig et al. 2004,  Table 1b  7  0.048    1.000  1.000  0.743  0.804    0.024  0.007 
Source  Network    Pt  ttri  ttri'  h'    P value 
Size  Sparseness      h'  ttri 
Lahti et al. 1994,  Table 1A  6  0.067    0.938  0.750  0.700  0.829    0.084  0.077 
Lahti et al. 1994,  Table 1C  8  0.071    0.974  0.897  0.768  0.833    0.002  0.002 
Lu et al. 2008,  Figure 1c(1)  13  0.103    0.973  0.890  0.696  0.751    0.000  0.000 
Lu et al. 2008,  Figure 1c(2)  13  0.167    0.973  0.890  0.748  0.797    0.000  0.000 
McMahan & Morris 1984,  Table 1  10  0.178    0.944  0.778  0.358  0.523    0.073  0.000 
Marler 1957,  Table 1b  8  0.000    1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000    0.000  0.000 
Masure & Allee 1934,  Table 1  13  0.000    0.997  0.986  0.986  0.989    0.000  0.000 
Masure & Allee 1934,  Table 2  11  0.018    0.949  0.795  0.758  0.818    0.000  0.000 
Masure & Allee 1934,  Table 3  7  0.000    0.960  0.840  0.714  0.786    0.033  0.006 
Møller 1987,  Table 1  13  0.308    1.000  1.000  0.678  0.748    0.000  0.000 
Møller 1987,  Table 2  10  0.044    1.000  1.000  0.925  0.946    0.000  0.000 
Møller 1987,  Table 3  14  0.396    1.000  1.000  0.470  0.578    0.001  0.000 
Monnin & Peeters 1999,  Table 1  6  0.200    1.000  1.000  0.250  0.544    0.280  0.208 
Murray 2007,  Table 5  18  0.693    0.938  0.750  0.087  0.230    0.177  0.024 
Nakano 1994,  Table 1  11  0.036    1.000  1.000  0.848  0.885    0.000  0.000 
Natoli & De Vito 1991,  Table 2  14  0.692    0.846  0.385  0.113  0.290    0.215  0.296 
Owens & Owens 1996,  Figure 1  7  0.238    1.000  1.000  0.600  0.752    0.080  0.034 
Paoli et al. 2006,  Table 2  8  0.036    0.800  0.200  0.161  0.428    0.251  0.224 
Paoli et al. 2006,  Table 3  6  0.267    1.000  1.000  0.850  0.915    0.052  0.152 
Parsons & Baptista 1980,  Table 4  8  0.000    0.929  0.714  0.714  0.810    0.006  0.004 
Patterson 1977,  Figure 5  18  0.536    0.842  0.366  0.120  0.258    0.092  0.038 
Patterson 1977,  Figure 6  28  0.751    0.961  0.845  0.057  0.155    0.116  0.001 
Poisbleau et al. 2006,  Figure 2a  16  0.067    0.888  0.551  0.439  0.532    0.000  0.000 
Poisbleau et al. 2006,  Figure 2b  19  0.491    0.920  0.680  0.174  0.294    0.028  0.000 
Richter et al. 2009,  Table 1  9  0.028    0.922  0.688  0.607  0.708    0.005  0.001 
Robbins 2008,  Table 2  8  0.179    0.903  0.613  0.446  0.631    0.071  0.031 
Rutberg 1986,  Table 1  22  0.610    0.973  0.891  0.141  0.253    0.026  0.000 
Source  Network    Pt  ttri  ttri'  h'    P value 
Size  Sparseness      h'  ttri 
Rutberg 1986,  Table 2  29  0.631    0.894  0.576  0.065  0.158    0.083  0.000 
Satoh & Ohkawara 2008,  Table 2c  8  0.143    1.000  1.000  0.893  0.905    0.001  0.000 
Satoh & Ohkawara 2008,  Table 2d  9  0.083    0.972  0.889  0.595  0.667    0.013  0.000 
Satoh & Ohkawara 2008,  Table 2e  10  0.578    1.000  1.000  0.333  0.515    0.076  0.110 
Setchell & Wickings 2005,  Table 4  8  0.000    1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000    0.000  0.000 
Setchell & Wickings 2005,  Table 3  11  0.000    0.968  0.872  0.867  0.895    0.000  0.000 
Smith 1976,  Table 1  7  0.048    1.000  1.000  0.886  0.929    0.008  0.004 
Somers & Nel 1998,  Table 2a  6  0.133    1.000  1.000  0.550  0.741    0.187  0.074 
Somers & Nel 1998,  Table 2b  8  0.107    0.938  0.750  0.571  0.691    0.028  0.019 
Somers & Nel 1998,  Table 2c  9  0.111    1.000  1.000  0.857  0.900    0.000  0.000 
Tamm 1977,  Table 1b  10  0.111    0.951  0.802  0.625  0.728    0.003  0.000 
Tarvin & Woolfenden 1997,  Table 5  16  0.292    0.986  0.946  0.620  0.684    0.000  0.000 
Vervaecke et al. 2000,  Table 2  6  0.067    1.000  1.000  0.900  0.943    0.038  0.043 
deWaal & Luttrell 1985,  Table 1  24  0.116    0.998  0.992  0.819  0.840    0.000  0.000 
Watt 1986,  Figure 1a  10  0.022    0.982  0.929  0.883  0.915    0.000  0.000 
Watt 1986,  Figure 1b  10  0.022    1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000    0.000  0.000 
Watt 1986,  Figure 1c  10  0.000    0.950  0.800  0.800  0.855    0.000  0.000 
Watt 1986,  Figure 1d  10  0.000    0.908  0.633  0.633  0.733    0.001  0.000 
Watt 1986,  Figure 1e  10  0.022    0.982  0.929  0.833  0.878    0.000  0.000 
West‐Eberhard 1986,  Table 5  7  0.524    1.000  1.000  0.229  0.498    0.293  0.333 
Wittemyer & Getz 2007,  Table 1  20  0.626    0.969  0.875  0.119  0.243    0.082  0.000 
Wittig & Boesch 2003,  Figure 1  15  0.162    0.996  0.985  0.754  0.799    0.000  0.000 
Zine & Krausman 2000,  Table 1  12  0.091    0.980  0.919  0.832  0.864    0.000  0.000 
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